

## Message Text

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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 040589 ACTION CAIRO INFO BONN BERLIN  
BRUSSELS AMMAN 28 FEB 74

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TOSEC 206 BRUSSELS FOR AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND

E.MO.11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.), GW, PFOR, PARM, ENRG

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S BONN VISIT

REFERENCE: A. SECTO 42, DAMASCUS 131 (NOTAL)

B. SECTO 1, STATE WH 40504 (NOTAL) EXDIS

BEGIN SUMMARY: YOUR PRESENCE IN BONN WILL AFFORD A TIMELY  
OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE THE CHANCELLOR AND FOREIGN MINISTER  
SCHEEL A FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT OF YOUR LATEST EFFORTS TO REACH  
A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT. IN OFFERING TO VISIT BONN  
(REFTEL B), YOU ALSO INDICATED TO SCHEEL A WILLINGNESS TO  
DISCUSS SALT II. OTHER ISSUES WHICH MAY ARISE ARE MBFR,  
CSCE AND THE ATLANTIC DECLARATIONS.

THE STOPOVER CAN ALSO BE USED TO FOSTER THE SPIRIT OF CO-  
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OPERAION WHICH THE GERMANS DISPLAYED AT THE ENERGY CON-

REFERENCE. THE GERMAN LEADERSHIP WILL VIEW YOUR VISIT IN PART AS AN EXPRESSION OF RECOGNITION OF THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE THE FRG PLAYED AT THE ENERGY CONFERENCE. IN THIS REGARD YOU MAY WISH TO BRIEF BRANDT AND SCHEEL ON THE FIRST MEETING OF THE ENERGY COORDINATING GROUP THIS WEEK IN WASHINGTON. (STATE 37856, TOSEC 80 CONTAINS A WRAPUP REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS.) IN VIEW OF THE MARCH 4 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETINGS IN BRUSSELS, YOU WILL PERHAPS FIND IT USEFUL TO REVIEW US RESERVATIONS ABOUT PROPOSED EC/ARAB COOPERATION.

THERE ARE ALSO IMPORTANT BILATERAL PROBLEMS WHICH IT WOULD BE FRUITFUL TO RAISE, IN PARTICULAR BERLIN ACCESS DIFFICULTIES RELATED TO THE FRG DECISION TO ESTABLISH A FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY IN WEST BERLIN. (SEE STATE 36043, TOSEC 26.) IN YOUR MEETING WITH BRANDT, YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO UNDERSCORE AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO THE CONCLUSION IN MARCH OF A HIGH QUALITY BILATERAL OFFSET AGREEMENT.

SALT

FRG POSITION: THE GERMANS WILL WANT TO HEAR OUR VIEWS ON SALT TWO. IN PARTICULAR, THEY WILL BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING WHETHER YOU ENVISAGE THE CONCLUSION OF A SALT TWO AGREEMENT FOR SIGNATURE BY THE PRESIDENT WHEN HE VISITS MOSCOW. THEY MAY ASK WHETHER A 1974 AGREEMENT OF AN OVERALL AND PERMANENT NATURE IS THOUGHT LIKELY OR POSSIBLE, OR WHETHER THERE MAY BE ANOTHER AGREEMENT OF AN INTERIM OR PARTIAL NATURE, AND, IF THE LATTER, WHAT IT MAY DEAL WITH. THEY MAY WANT REASSURANCE THAT THE INTERESTS OF THE FRG AND OUR OTHER ALLIES WILL BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR.

(AMBASSADOR JOHNSON BRIEFED THE NAC ON THE CURRENT US SALT POSITION ON FEBRUARY 27.)

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

--THE US REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PER-  
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MANENT AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION PROVIDING ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS (ICBMS, SLBMS AND HEAVY BOMBERS) BUT WE INTEND TO GIVE PRIORITY CONSIDERATION IN THE PRESENT SESSION TO THE CONCEPT OF LIMITING ICBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT ON THE BASIS OF ESSENTIALLY EQUAL RIGHTS AS A CENTRAL AND URGENT ASPECT OF THE TOTAL PROBLEM.

--SINCE THE SOVIETS ARE NOW ENGAGED IN AN EXTENSIVE

TESTING PROGRAM FOR MIRVS, IT IS IMPORTANT TO SEEK AN EARLY AGREEMENT WITH THEM IN THIS AREA.

--THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV HAVE SAID THAT SERIOUS EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO REACH A SALT TWO AGREEMENT IN 1974. WE ARE STILL COMMITTED TO THAT GOAL, BUT ITS ACHIEVEMENT WILL REQUIRE HARD WORK AND DIFFICULT NEGOTIATION.

--WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO OUR POSITION AGAINST THE INCLUSION IN SALT OF WHAT THE SOVIETS CALL FORWARD-BASED

SYSTEMS. WE APPRECIATE THE INTEREST OF OUR ALLIES IN THIS SUBJECT AND WE WILL KEEP THE FRG FULLY INFORMED.

IF THE GERMANS ASK ABOUT THE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SALT AND MBFR:

--MBFR CONCERNS THE NATO-WARSAW PACT BALANCE IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND SELECTED NUCLEAR ELEMENTS COULD BE ADDRESSED IN ORDER TO GET AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. SALT CONCERNS THE CENTRAL US-SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE, AND OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS ARE ONLY MENTIONED INsofar AS THEY HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO AFFECT THAT STRATEGIC BALANCE (I.E., OUR SALT POSITION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION).

--THUS, THERE IS NO EXPLICIT OR NECESSARY LINK BETWEEN THE TWO NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE BELIEVE IT IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO KEEP THEM SEPARATE.

BERLIN: FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY (FEA)

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SOVIET POSITION: THE SOVIETS INSIST THAT FRG ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEA IN BERLIN WOULD VIOLATE THE QUADRIpartite AGREEMENT (QA), AND THAT RETALIATORY COUNTERMEASURES WOULD BE IN ORDER. THEY HAVE INDICATED TO US THAT THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO CONSULT ON THE MATTER, ALTHOUGH THEY PREFER THAT THE ALLIES FORBID THE FRG TO SET UP THE FEA. THUS FAR, THEY HAVE AVOIDED PUBLIC POLEMICS AND CONFINED THEIR SHOW OF DISPLEASURE TO UNPUBLICIZED DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE THREE WESTERN ALLIES AND THE FRG. THEY HAVE LEFT THEMSELVES ROOM FOR MANEUVER, AND HAVE NOT SAID PRECISELY WHAT THEY OR THE GDR WOULD DO ONCE THE FEA IS ESTABLISHED, ALTHOUGH CLEAR THREATS TO INTERFERE WITH BERLIN ACCESS HAVE BEEN MADE.

FRG POSITION: THE FRG SHARES THE ALLIED VIEW THAT THE

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FEA IS FULLY IN LINE WITH THE QA. CHANCELLOR BRANDT HAS ASKED THE PRESIDENT TO TAKE A STRONG POSITION AGAINST ANY EFFORT TO RESTRICT TRAFFIC ON THE BERLIN ACCESS ROUTES, AND THE PRESIDENT HAS ASSURED BRANDT OF OUR SUPPORT ON THIS. BRANDT'S PERSONAL VIEWS ON HOW THE FRG SHOULD PROCEED IN EXPANDING ITS FUTURE TIES WITH BERLIN ARE NOT YET KNOWN. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE FAVORS TEMPORARY MORATORIUM ON ANY FURTHER BUILD-UP OF THE FRG PRESENCE, BUT AS FORMER GOVERNING MAYOR OF BERLIN,

AND IN VIEW OF OPPOSITION AND OTHER PRESSURES, UNDOUBTEDLY RECOGNIZES THE POLITICAL UNPOPULARITY OF SUCH A POLICY IN BERLIN AND THE FRG. EGON BAHR CERTAINLY AND BRANDT POSSIBLY WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THE WESTERN ALLIES DECREE SUCH A MORATORIUM. THE GERMANS ARE AWARE THAT THE ALLIES ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE FRG FAILURE TO CONSULT PROPERLY WITH THEM BEFORE DECIDING TO SET UP THE FEA (A BACKGROUND PAPER FOLLOWS THE TALKING POINTS.) HOWEVER, BRANDT MAY RESIST A FIRM FRG COMMITMENT TO ADVANCE CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES ON FUTURE BERLIN MATTERS, PARTLY FROM A FEELING THAT THIS IS AN OUTMODED REQUIREMENT IN VIEW OF THE CHANGING POLITICAL SITUATION, PARTLY FROM A FEAR THAT THE FRG MAY NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL ITS OWN BUNDESTAG CONTINGENT SUFFICIENTLY TO DELIVER ON SUCH A COMMITMENT.

US-ALLIED POSITION: WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT THE FRG  
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DECISION TO ESTABLISH THE FEA IN BERLIN IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE QA, BUT HAVE DEFERRED A REPLY TO THEIR SUGGESTION IN WASHINGTON FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS ON THIS MATTER. WE ALSO HAVE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT ANY ACCESS INTERFERENCE WOULD CONSTITUTE A CLEAR VIOLATION OF THE QA AND COULD IN NO WAY BE JUSTIFIED AS A RESPONSE TO EVENTS IN BERLIN TO WHICH THE SOVIETS OR THE GDR TAKE EXCEPTION.

AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN TO THE FRG ABOUT THE INADEQUATE CONSULTATION ON THE FEA AND HAVE PROPOSED THAT AN UNDERSTANDING ON AGREED CONSULTATION PROCEDURES ON FUTURE BERLIN MATTERS BE WORKED OUT IN BONN GROUP. WE WOULD PREFER TO TELL THE FRG THAT WHILE THE ALLIES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR DECIDING THE LEGALITY UNDER THE QA OF MEASURES CONCERNING BERLIN, IT IS UP TO FRG IN THE LAST ANALYSIS TO DETERMINE WHETHER A LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE ACTION IS POLITICALLY DESIRABLE AT ANY GIVEN TIME. THE FRG HAS ALSO BEEN TOLD THAT WE DO NOT FAVOR FORMAL OR INFORMAL FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE FEA QUESTION.

WE ARE AT ODDS WITH THE OTHER TWO WESTERN ALLIES ON THE

QUESTION OF A FURTHER EXPANSION OF THE FEDERAL PRESENCE IN WEST BERLIN. THE FRENCH WOULD LIKE TO HAVE A FLAT ALLIED BAN ON SUCH EXPANSION, OF A MORE OR LESS PERMANENT NATURE. THE BRITISH WOULD LIKE AN ALLIED ORDER FOR A TEMPORARY MORATORIUM. WE THINK A TEMPORARY MORATORIUM A GOOD IDEA BUT WOULD PREFER TO SEE THE FRG BITE THIS POLITICAL BULLET ON ITS OWN.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

--WE HAVE EVERY INTENTION OF STANDING FIRM IN THE

FACE OF PRESENT SOVIET PRESSURE AGAINST BERLIN. WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCEPT ANY TRADE-OFF IN WHICH WE AGREE TO UNDO AN ACTION, LEGALLY PERMISSIBLE UNDER THE QA, IN RETURN FOR A SOVIET PROMISE THAT THE GDR WILL NOT DO SOMETHING WHICH IS CLEARLY IN VIOLATION OF THE BERLIN AGREEMENT.

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--WE BELIEVE THAT THE FOUR WESTERN POWERS MUST STAND TOGETHER AND MAKE CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT ANY INTERFERENCE WITH ACCESS IS UNACCEPTABLE AND WOULD HAVE UNFORGETTABLE CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL OF US.

--IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ALLIES IN THE FUTURE WORK CLOSELY TOGETHER IN A COORDINATED MANNER AND BEFORE DECISIONS ABOUT BERLIN ARE MADE. IT IS PRECISELY THIS CONSIDERATION WHICH HAS PROMPTED OUR PROPOSAL THAT AN UNDERSTANDING OF CONSULTATIVE PROCEDURES BE WORKED OUT IN THE BONN GROUP.

--WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW THE FRG VIEWS THE PRESENT SITUATION AND WHAT THE FRG ITSELF IS PREPARED TO DO TO FIND A WAY TO RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIETS, WITHOUT IN ANY WAY GIVING THE SOVIETS A VOICE IN WHAT IS DONE OR NOT DONE IN WEST BERLIN.

--WE DO NOT FAVOR FORMAL OR INFORMAL FOUR POWER CONSULTATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS UNDER THE FINAL QUADRIPARTITE PROTOCOL. NO MATTER HOW CIRCUMSCRIBED, SUCH CONSULTATIONS WOULD REOPEN THE QUESTION OF THE FRG'S ROLE IN BERLIN AND COULD LEAD TO A FURTHER RESTRICTION ON FRG ACTIVITY IN THE CITY. THIS INEVITABLY ALSO WOULD GIVE THE SOVIETS A VOICE IN DECIDING WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE DONE IN WEST BERLIN. THIS IS PROPERLY A THREE-POWER RESPONSIBILITY ALONE AND MUST REMAIN SO.

--AS TO FUTURE INITIATIVES ON BERLIN, WE BELIEVE THAT

THE PROPER ALLIED ROLE IS TO RULE ON THEIR LEGALITY UNDER THE QA. IT IS UP TO THE FRG TO DETERMINE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WHETHER ANY ACTION IS POLITICALLY DESIRABLE AT ANY GIVEN TIME. WE WOULD THEN BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE FRG'S JUDGMENT.

BACKGROUND PAPER ON FRG CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES ON BERLIN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY

WHEN EGON BAHR WAS IN WASHINGTON RECENTLY, THE DEPUTY SECRETARY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIES ON FUTURE NEW FRG OFFICES IN BERLIN AND REMARKED,  
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IN THIS CONNECTION, THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATE FRG CONSULTATION ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE. BAHR DISPUTED THIS, ALLEGING THAT THE FRG HAD CONSULTED FULLY WITH THE ALLIES IN ADVANCE. SUBSEQUENTLY, BAHR MADE SIMILAR CLAIMS IN BONN AND ELSEWHERE.

ALL OF THE ALLIES HAVE TAKEN ISSUE WITH BAHR'S ASSERTIONS. THE BRITISH AND WE ALSO HAVE REVIEWED OUR FILES ON THIS MATTER AND ARE AGREED THAT THERE WAS NO BONN GROUP CONSULTATION PRIOR TO GENSCHER'S AUGUST 27 ANNOUNCEMENT IN BERLIN THAT A FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THESE FINDINGS RECENTLY WERE DRAWN TO THE ATTENTION OF FRG FOREIGN OFFICE STATE SECRETARY FRANK AND THE ALLIES INTEND TO RAISE THEM DIRECTLY WITH BAHR AT THE NEXT APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY.

A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY FOLLOWS:

APRIL 17: THE HEAD OF SENATSKANZLEI INFORMED THE ALLIED MISSIONS IN BERLIN THAT THE SENAT WAS INTERESTED IN HAVING A FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY ESTABLISHED IN BERLIN. THE ALLIED REPS WERE INFORMED THAT THE GOVERNING MAYOR WAS WRITING TO THE FEDERAL CHANCELLOR TO UNDERLINE BERLIN'S INTEREST IN THIS KIND OF ORGANIZATION. NO FORMAL PROPOSAL WAS PUT TO THE ALLIED MISSIONS, NOR WERE THE ALLIED MISSIONS ASKED FOR THEIR VIEWS.

JULY 10: THE SENAT CHANCELLERY RELEASED A REPORT SUMMARIZING AND EVALUATING SENAT EFFORTS TO EXPAND THE ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES IN BERLIN AND ATTRACT ADDITIONAL OFFICES TO THE CITY. AMONG THE PROJECTS LISTED TO BE RAISED WITH CHANCELLOR BRANDT WAS THE FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL OFFICE. A COPY OF THIS REPORT WAS GIVEN TO THE ALLIES, BUT THERE WAS NO CONSULTATION.

AUGUST 23: THE SENAT INFORMED THE ALLIED MISSIONS IN BERLIN THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT INTENDED SETING UP THE FEA IN BERLIN AND THAT AN ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE MADE TO THIS EFFECT WHEN GENSCHER CAME TO BERLIN ON AUGUST 27. THIS MATTER WAS RAISED BY THE ALLIES AT A BONN GROUP SECRET

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MEETING THE SAME DAY, BUT NEITHER THE FRG NOR SENAT REPS HAD DEFINITE INFORMATION. LATER THE SAME DAY, BOTH GERMAN REPS IN BONN SEPARATELY TOLD THE ALLIED BONN GROUP REPS THAT NO FIRM DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN DURING GENSCHER'S VISIT TO BERLIN, ALTHOUGH THE MATTER WOULD BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN HIM AND GOVERNING MAYOR SCHUETZ.

AUGUST 27: SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR BELETSKIY, IN THE COURSE OF OTHER BUSINESS, INFORMALLY EXPRESSED STRONG SOVIET DISAPPROVAL OF THE GENSCHER DECISION.

SEPTEMBER 10: THE FIRST SOVIET OFFICIAL PROTEST ON THE FEA WAS MADE IN BERLIN TO THE ALLIED CHAIRMAN DEPUTY COMMANDANT.

SEPTEMBER 13: FOLLOWING TRIPARTITE DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE ALLIED AMBASSADORS THE PREVIOUS DAY OF THE SOVIET PROTEST, FIRST BONN GROUP DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE ON FRG DECISION TO ESTABLISH FEA. ALLIES TABLED VIEWS ON HOW BEST TO RESPOND TO SOVIET PROTEST IN BERLIN. FRG FONOFF REP BLECH SAID HE COULD NOT ANSWER VARIOUS TECHNICAL QUESTIONS ON THE DRAFT LAW TO ESTABLISH THE OFFICE AND SUGGESTED AN ALLIED MEETING AT AN EARLY DATE WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL BUNDESSTELLE, DR. LERNER.

FEBRUARY 18/19, 1974: ALLIES LEARN FOR FIRST TIME, VIA ROUND ABOUT MEANS, THAT THREE MORE FEDERAL OFFICES, A SPACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, CULTURAL FOUNDATION AND A SECOND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INSTITUTE (DISTINCT FROM THE FEA) HAVE ALLEGEDLY BEEN APPROVED FOR ESTABLISHMENT IN BERLIN BY BAHR AND BRANDT. THE SPACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE IS ALREADY A LINE ITEM IN FRG BUDGET. FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS CLAIMED TO KNOW NOTHING ABOUT THESE PROPOSALS.

MBFR

FRG POSITION: THE FRG HAS BEEN A STRONG PROPONENT OF MBFR, BUT THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT ITS VIEWS MAY NOW BE IN FLUX. CONCERN THAT MBFR NOT PLACE THE FRG IN A SPECIAL ZONE OR ROLE HAS CAUSED BONN TO ADOPT AN INCREAS- SECRET

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INGLY CAUTIOUS POSTURE WHICH DOES NOT ALWAYS COINCIDE WITH OURS. BONN ALSO SHARES INCREASING EC NINE CONCERN THAT MBFR NOT INHIBIT POTENTIAL WESTERN EUROPEAN FLEXIBILITY IN DEFENSE COOPERATION. FINALLY, WHILE BONN CONTINUES TO FAVOR BEING INCLUDED IN PHASE TWO, THE ACTUAL GERMAN ROLE IN IT IS UNDER DEBATE WITHIN THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

SCHEEL MAY ASK ABOUT YOUR VIEWS ON AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. THE FRG AND UK HAVE BEEN PRESSING FOR TRILATERAL TALKS WITH US AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF MBFR, AND ARE CONCERNED THAT THEY NOT BE PRESENTED WITH A FINAL US VIEW AS A FACT ACCOMPLI.

SCHEEL MAY EXPRESS FEARS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT OF US/USSR BILATERALISM IN MBFR. SCHEEL MAY ASK ABOUT THE IDEA OF A TEMPORARY FORCE LIMITATION AGREEMENT AS PART OF PHASE ONE. (SOME FRG OFFICIALS FAVOR THIS AS AN ALLIED BAR-GAINING CHIP.)

US POSITION: WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY RECENT SOVIET AGREEMENT IN VIENNA TO TALK FIRST ABOUT US/SOVIET GROUND FORCES. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS ALSO INTEND TO RAISE THE SUBJECTS OF NATIONAL FORCES AND AIR AND NUCLEAR FORCES. WE CONTINUE TO BE COMMITTED TO A COMMON CEILING. AS A TACTICAL MOVE WE ARE PREPARED TO HAVE THE ALLIES TELL THE SOVIETS THAT PHASE TWO COULD BEGIN A FIXED PERIOD OF TIME AFTER PHASE ONE, AND TO GIVE AN ALLIED ASSURANCE THAT FORCES OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING THE FRG, WOULD BE INVOLVED IN PHASE TWO IN RETURN FOR AN EQUIVALENT SOVIET COMMITMENT TO A COMMON CEILING. WE AGREE THAT MBFR SHOULD NOT INHIBIT FUTURE ALLIED FLEXIBILITY OR PREJUDICE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION. WE HAVE INVITED THE FRG AND UK TO HOLD TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF MBFR DURING THE THIRD WEEK OF MARCH. WE ARE STUDYING THE QUESTION OF SOME GREATER ALLIED ACCESS TO NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM), BUT CANNOT YET GIVE ANY ASSURANCES TO THE FRG ON THIS MATTER.

YOUR TALPNG POINTY:

OLHH --WZHWANT TO KNOWHSCHZELS VIEWS ON THE ROLE OF GER-  
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MAN FORCES IN PHASE TWO.

--WE BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS



IN MBFR ON BOTH US/SOVIET AND OTHER NATIONAL FORCES WITHOUT MORTGAGING FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION OR SERIOUSLY INHIBITING ALLIED FLEXIBILITY.

--WE APPRECIATE THE GERMAN CONCERN THAT THE FRG NOT BE SINGLED OUT IN MBFR THROUGH CREATION OF A SPECIAL ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

IF THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR TRILATERALS COMES UP:

--WE LOOK FORWARD TO OUR TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS PROPOSED FOR THE THIRD WEEK IN MARCH AND VIEW THESE AS A CHANCE TO CONSULT AND EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH AN OPEN MIND.

IF SCHEEL REQUESTS GERMAN ACCESS TO NTM:

--WE ARE AWARE OF GERMAN CONCERNS ON THIS POINT; THE QUESTION IS COMPLICATED, RELATES TO OTHER ALLIES AS WELL AS THE FRG, AND HAS IMPLICATIONS BEYOND MBFR; WE ARE STUDYING IT.

IF SCHEEL RAISES THE FLA IDEA:

--WE ARE STUDYING THIS QUESTION, AND BELIEVE IT IS ONE ON WHICH THE ALLIES SHOULD PROCEED WITH GREAT CAUTION.

CSCE

FRG POSITION: GERMAN POLICY TOWARD CSCE IS CLOSELY FOLLOWED BY FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL, WHO MAY WISH TO HEAR YOUR CUJD  
NT VIEWS ON THE CONFERENCE. THE FRG HOPES TO AVOID A RIGID "FRONTIER INVIOABILITY" PRINCIPLE, WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO FORECLOSE PEACEFUL CHANGES OF BORDERS AND THUS THE REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY. WITH THE SOVIETS CONTINUING TO PRESS AT GENEVA FOR FRONTIER INVIOABILITY FORMULATION WITHOUT ANY LINKAGE, THE GERMANS ARE SUPPORT-  
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ING FRENCH EFFORTS TO DEVELOP IMPLICIT LINKAGE BETWEEN INVIOABILITY AND PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS.

ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES (CBMS), GERMANS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS, DESPITE ALLIED EXPECTATIONS THAT SOVIETS WILL REJECT THIS-- BUT PLAN TO DROP SUCH SUPPORT IN EXCHANGE FOR SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF MORE BINDING CBMS ON MANEUVERS. RE FOLLOW-ON ACTIVITIES, SCHEEL HAS FLOATED INFORMALLY WITHIN THE EC NINE THE IDEA THAT A "COORDINATING COMMITTEE" WITHOUT A

PERMANENT SECRETARIAT COULD MEET ANNUALLY OR AD HOC TO REVIEW QUESTIONS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND COOPERATION. FORMALLY, HOWEVER, THE FRG HAS JOINED THE NINE, WHO HAVE TAKEN (PERHAPS TEMPORARILY) A RESERVED POSITION ON PERMANENT MACHINERY, CALLING SIMPLY FOR A POST-CSCE "PROBATIONARY PERIOD" OF THREE OR FOUR YEARS TO BE CAPPED BY HIGH-LEVEL REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS.

US POSITION: WE BELIEVE THE PROBLEM OF INCLUDING REFERENCE TO "PEACEFUL CHANGE" IN THE CSCE DECLARATION SHOULD BE RESOLVED PRIMARILY BETWEEN THE FRENCH (IN CONSULTATION WITH THE FRG) AND SOVIETS, AS SPONSORS OF DECLARATIONS OF PRINCIPLES TABLED AT GENEVA. RE CBMS, WE HAVE TOLD THE GERMANS WE WOULD PREFER TO AVOID TABLING OF LANGUAGE ON MOVEMENTS. AS FOR FOLLOW-ON, WE PRESENTLY SEE NO NEED FOR CREATING A NEW BODY TO DEAL WITH EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS, BUT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SCHEEL'S VIEWS.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

--WE UNDERSTAND THE FRG'S PROBLEM ON PEACEFUL CHANGE OF FRONTIERS, AND ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT A REASONABLE COMPROMISE ON THIS POINT.

--ON CBMS, WE WILL REMAIN SILENT FOR THE TIME BEING AT GENEVA ON THE UK PROPOSAL FOR PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS, BUT WE CONTINUE TO OPPOSE INCLUSION OF MOVEMENTS.

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--WITH RESPECT TO FOLLOW-ON, WE CONTINUE TO DOUBT THE NEED FOR CREATION OF A NEW BODY TO DEAL WITH EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND SECURITY QUESTIONS, BUT WOULD BE INTERESTED IN SCHEEL'S VIEWS.

THE ATLANTIC DECLARATIONS

FRG POSITION: THE GERMANS HAVE BEEN FORTHCOMING IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATO TEXT, BUT RELUCTANT TO TAKE ISSUE WITH THE FRENCH CONCERNING THOSE ASPECTS OF THE US/EC DECLARATION ON WHICH THE FRENCH HAVE STRONG VIEWS. ALTHOUGH THE FRG INITIALLY WAS AMONG THE MOST NEGATIVE OF THE EC CONCERNING THE US PROPOSAL FOR A TRI-REGIONAL DECLARATION WITH THE JAPANESE, THEY RECENTLY INFORMED THE GOJ THAT BONN WOULD NOT HAVE ANY PARTICULAR OBJECTION TO A TRI-REGIONAL DECLARATION, ONCE THE BILATERAL DECLARATIONS ARE WORKED OUT. (SEE TOSEC SEPTTEL CONTAINING REPORT OF

HARTMAN-YASUKAWA CONVERSATION OF FEBRUARY 27).

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

--TIMING: THE TEXTS OF THE DECLARATIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED IN TIME TO MAKE POSSIBLE THEIR SIGNATURE IN LATE APRIL. WHILE AN EXACT DATE FOR A POSSIBLE TRIP TO EUROPE BY THE PRESIDENT DURING THIS PERIOD IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION, WE ARE POINTING TOWARD THE LAST TWO WEEKS IN APRIL FOR PLANNING PURPOSES. THE STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE DECLARATIONS WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN REACHING A FINAL DECISION.

-- GIVE YOUR LATEST VIEWS ON VENUE FOR NATO S SUMMIT.

--AS FAR AS THE US/EC TEXT IS CONCERNED, WE LOOK FORWARD TO RECEIVING THE NEW, REVISED DRAFT AROUND MARCH 5, AND, IN THAT CASE, WOULD BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH THE EC POLITICAL DIRECTORS IN MID-MARCH TO DISCUSS IT. WE HOPE THE NEW TEXT WILL BE SHORTER AND MORE FORCEFUL THAN THE EARLIER VERSION AND WILL INCLUDE MORE FORTHCOMING LANGUAGE

IN SOME OF THE KEY AREAS, SUCH AS CONSULTATIONS AND INTER-SECRET

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DEPENDENCE OF ISSUES.

--REGARDING THE NATO TEXT, ALTHOUGH SOME PROBLEMS REMAIN, WE SEEM CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON A DRAFT WE BELIEVE WILL BE SEEN AS A STRONG RESTATEMENT OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY.

--WE ALSO BELIEVE IT IS ESSENTIAL TO ASSOCIATE JAPAN IN A FULLY EQUAL WAY WITH THE DECLARATION ENTERPRISE. WE WANT SOME FORM OF A TRI-REGIONAL DOCUMENT TO BE SIGNED DURING THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP, IN ORDER TO VISIBLY LINK JAPAN'S FUTURE WITH THAT OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIES IN COMMON ENDEAVOR.

--THIS TRI-REGIONAL DOCUMENT NEED NOT BE WITH THE EC AS AN INSTITUTION, AND, IN FACT, SINCE IT PREFERABLY WOULD CONTAIN SOME MINIMAL LANGUAGE ON SECURITY IT PROBABLY COULD BEST BE PREPARED UNDER AN AD HOC ARRANGEMENT.

--WE BELIEVE THAT THE EXCLUSION OF JAPAN FROM A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE "INNER CLUB" OF NORTH AMERICAN AND WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES COULD, OVER A PERIOD OF TIME, HAVE IMPORTANT AND DAMAGING EFFECTS ON JAPAN'S POLICIES, AND ENCOURAGE A SENSE OF DRIFT AND ISOLATION

AMONG THE JAPANESE.

OFFSET

FRG POSITION: THE FRG WANTS OFFSET NEGOTIATIONS COMPLETED, PARTLY TO ELIMINATE ONE US/FRG PROBLEM. HOWEVER, IN LIGHT OF FRG POLITICAL AND FISCAL CONSIDERATIONS, THE GERMANS HAVE REFUSED TO INCREASE THEIR OFFSET OFFER SUFFICIENTLY TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR AGREEMENT. DURING THE WEEK OF THE WEC, FINANCE MINISTER SCHMIDT AND FRG OFFSET NEGOTIATOR HERMES OFFERED ONLY A MODEST INCREASE IN HARD OFFSET (TO COVER URANIUM ENRICHMENT SERVICES AND R AND D PROJECTS) AND EXPRESSED WILLINGNESS TO GRANT A CONCESSIONAL LOAN OF ABOUT DOLS. 550 MILLION. THERE IS SOME REASON TO BELIEVE THE FRG REMAINS UNCONVINCED OF BOTH THE IMPORTANCE THE USG ATTACHES TO A NEW OFFSET AGREEMENT AND THE PROSPECT THAT FAILURE TO SATISFY JACKSON-NUNN REQUIRE-  
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MENTS WILL RESULT IN UNILATERAL US FORCE REDUCTIONS.

US POSITION: A SATISFACTORY BILATERAL OFFSET AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIAL TO MEET JACKSON-NUNN REQUIREMENTS. WE WOULD LIKE TO COMPLETE THE NEGOTIATIONS BY MID-MARCH IF POSSIBLE. WHILE 100 PER CENT HARD OFFSET APPEARS UNATTAINABLE, A COMBINATION OF HARD AND SOFT COMPONENTS MUST ADD UP TO FULL OFFSET TO AVERT TROOP CUTS.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

--WE WELCOME CHANCELLOR BRANDT'S REAFFIRMATION--IN HIS RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S JANUARY LETTER--OF THE NEED FOR AN OFFSET AGREEMENT SO THAT US FORCE REDUCTIONS CAN BE AVOIDED.

--THE JACKSON-NUNN AMENDMENT MAKES TROOP CUTS MANDATORY IF ITS REQUIREMENT FOR 100 PER CENT OFFSET FROM OUR NATO ALLIES IS NOT MET. SINCE ABOUT THREE-FOURTHS OF OUR NATO MILITARY SPENDING TAKES PLACE IN THE FRG, THIS TARGET CAN BE REACHED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF A SATISFACTORY US/FRG BILATERAL OFFSET AGREEMENT.

--IN THE AFTERMATH OF MINISTER SCHMIDT'S DISCUSSION WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ WE ARE CAREFULLY REVIEWING OUR POSITION ONCE MORE IN AN EFFORT TO BE AS HELPFUL AS POSSIBLE. IF THE FRG WILL DEMONSTRATE SOME FURTHER FLEXIBILITY, WE BELIEVE THAT AN OFFSET AGREEMENT, BASED ON A COMBINATION OF HARD AND SOFT COMPONENTS, CAN BE CONCLUDED AT THE NEXT NEGOTIATING SESSION AND SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDED IN CONGRESS. A LETTER FROM SECRETARY SHULTZ, EXPLORING A WAY TO REACH

MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF A LARGER  
LOAN COMPONENT, IS BEING TRANSMITTED TO MINISTER SCHMIDT.

--ESPECIALLY IN THE LIGHT OF JACKSON-NUNN REQUIRE-  
MENTS, A NEW OFFSET AGREEMENT IS OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE FOR  
THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES, AND WE ATTACH  
GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE EARLY COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIA-  
TIONS, IF POSSIBLE BY MID-MARCH.

EC/ARAB COOPERATION

SECRET

SECRET

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EC POSITION: THE EC FOREIGN MINISTERS WILL MEET IN BRUS-  
SELS ON MARCH 4 TO CONSIDER, AND PROBABLY WILL APPROVE,  
A POLITICAL COMMITTEE REPORT ON EC/ARAB COOPERATION. THE  
REPORT RECOMMENDS EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH THE ARABS BY  
SCHEEL, FOLLOWED BY ESTABLISHMENT OF JOINT COMMISSIONS  
AND THEREAFTER AN EC/ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE  
THIS FALL.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

--ANY EC POLITICAL APPROACH TO ARAB COUNTRIES IN THE  
ABSENCE OF A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT COULD PROVE VERY HARM  
FUL TO OUR EFFORTS TO FIND A PERMANENT SOLUTION UNLESS  
CAREFULLY ORCHESTRATED IN ADVANCE WITH THE US. EVEN ECO-  
NOMIC COOPERATION PROPOSALS WOULD MOST LIKELY INCLUDE  
MILITARY EQUIPMENT SUPPLY AND OTHER MATTERS WITH STRONG  
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS.

--WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT BROAD NEW INSTITUTIONAL AR-  
RANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE TO ARABS OR OTHER PRODUCERS UN-  
TIL MAJOR CONSUMING COUNTRIES HAVE FULLY DISCUSSED AND  
AGREED UPON HOW BEST TO PURSUE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES WITH  
PRODUCING COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD NOT, OF COURSE, RULE OUT  
SOME FORM OF EXPLORATORY DIALOGUE WITH PRODUCERS.

--WE PARTICULARLY HOPE THAT EC NINE COUNTRIES WILL  
TAKE NO BINDING DECISIONS AT THIS TIME ON POSSIBLE EC/  
ARAB COOPERATION ARRANGEMENTS.

--IN THIS CONNECTION, WE WERE PLEASED TO LEARN THAT  
THE FRG DOES NOT PLAN TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A  
FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE WITH THE ARABS AT THIS TIME.  
YOU MAY WISH TO SUGGEST THAT SCHEEL ALSO NOT DISCUSS THE  
CREATION OF JOINT COMMISSIONS UNTIL AFTER CONCLUSION OF  
HIS EXPLORATORY TALKS AND SUBSEQUENT CONSULTATION WITH  
THE US. CREATION OF SUCH COMMISSIONS IS A SIGNIFICANT  
INSTITUTIONAL STEP WHICH WOULD SEEM TO INDICATE A FIRM EC

COMMITMENT TO PROCEED TO AN AGREEMENT; TO SIGNAL THIS TO THE ARABS BEFOREHAND WOULD DEPRIVE THE EC OF NEGOTIATING FLEXIBILITY IN THE EXPLORATORY TALKS AND THE US OF AN  
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OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT.

ENERGY

FRG POSITION: THE GERMAN DELEGATION TO THE ENERGY CO-ORDINATING GROUP (ECG) WAS CLEARLY IMPRESSED WITH THE SERIOUSNESS OF OUR PURPOSE AND THE DEPTH OF OUR PREPARATION. SOME PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES, MOST NOTABLY IRELAND, REMAIN HESITANT TO MOVE AHEAD AND HAVE RAISED PROCEDURAL ISSUES WHICH MASK THIS RELUCTANCE. NEVERTHELESS, PARTICIPATING COUNTRIES ARE NOW STUDYING OUR PROPOSED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR FUTURE ACTIVITIES IN THE EXPECTATION OF BEGINNING SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WHEN WE MEET IN BRUSSELS, MARCH 13-14.

US POSITION: WE CONSIDER THAT GOOD PROGRESS WAS MADE AT THE FIRST ECG MEETING--PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS ARE NOW CONSIDERING OUR SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS AND A PROCEDURAL APPROACH WHICH WOULD MAINTAIN THE FOCUS OF ACTIVITY IN THE ECG.

YOUR TALKING POINTS:

--WE APPRECIATE THE CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE THE FRG PLAYED AT THE WEC AND THE ECG AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUED GERMAN SUPPORT IN THE ECG.

--THE FOCUS OF OUR EFFORTS MUST CONTINUE TO BE THE ENERGY COORDINATING GROUP. CERTAIN APPROPRIATE ISSUES BEING DEALT WITH BY EXISTING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. ATTEMPTS TO PROCEDURALLY WHITTLE AWAY AT THIS COMMON ENTERPRISE SHOULD BE RESISTED. CASEY UNQTE DONALDSON

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